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The product

API access with a boundary you can operate.

Gatekyper puts an enforceable control plane between machine identities and the provider credentials they need. Each request is identified, scoped, checked, and recorded before it reaches an upstream API.

Control plane

The provider key stays behind the gateway.

One protected credential can serve many apps, agents, workers, projects, and environments without being copied into each caller.

01 / Store

Provider Vault

Add a provider credential through the authenticated admin surface. Gatekyper encrypts it with AES-256-GCM, binds the ciphertext to its organization and credential context, and stores only a redacted hint for later identification.

Test a candidate credential, activate it, retire the previous version, and revoke it when the transition is complete.

02 / Issue

Gate Tokens

Give each app or agent a high-entropy gk_live_, gk_test_, or gk_tmp_ token.

The plaintext appears once. Gatekyper keeps a public lookup identifier and a peppered HMAC—not a reusable token secret.

Product modules

Control before the request. Evidence after it.

Gatekyper’s dashboard is the place to describe access. The gateway is the place where those decisions become real.

Runtime policy

Restrict providers, capabilities, models, endpoints, environments, required metadata, expiration, rate, and production access. Policies are deny-by-default.

Spend Guard

Reserve budget before forwarding, then settle to observed usage. Daily and monthly windows can observe, warn, or hard-stop according to policy.

Agent requests

MCP-connected agents can inspect their own access and request a temporary token. Requests outside a bounded safe template wait for a human approval.

Usage and denials

Proxied requests become usage events. Requests blocked before the provider call become separate denial events, so the two ledgers do not blur together.

Rotation

Switch the active upstream credential while Gate Tokens remain stable. Applications keep the same internal identity through a provider-key rotation.

Kill switches

Revoke a token or stop access by actor, project, provider, environment, agent-created token class, or the entire gateway—with an audit event for the action.

Request path

Every request earns its way through.

The dashboard is not in the hot path. The gateway validates the caller, resolves a provider route, applies policy, and only then unlocks the active provider credential.

Fail closedStreaming pass-throughMetadata by default
  1. Authenticate the actor

    Verify the Gate Token by public identifier and constant-time hash comparison. The public identifier alone never authenticates.
  2. Resolve the request

    Normalize the provider, capability, model, endpoint, environment, and required request metadata.
  3. Evaluate policy

    Apply explicit allowlists, production scope, expiration, rate limits, and deny rules before a provider is contacted.
  4. Reserve spend

    Atomically reserve a conservative estimate against the active budget window. A hard-stop policy denies a request that cannot reserve.
  5. Unlock and forward

    Decrypt the active provider credential only in gateway memory, inject the provider’s native authentication, and stream the response.
  6. Settle and record

    Reconcile the reservation to observed usage, then write a usage or denial event with a safe request identifier.

Provider adapters

Known routes, explicit capabilities.

Gatekyper supports native provider behavior instead of pretending every API has the same shape.

OpenAI

Chat, responses, embeddings, images, transcription, and speech

Anthropic

Native Messages API

OpenRouter

OpenAI-compatible chat and embeddings

Cloudflare Workers AI

Account-scoped chat and image routes

Replicate

Native prediction creation and status

GitHub

Allowlisted repository-oriented REST routes

Unknown paths are denied instead of being forwarded as an arbitrary URL proxy. OpenAI and OpenRouter can use the OpenAI-compatible gateway surface; Anthropic and the other adapters retain provider-prefixed native routes.

Agent access

Request-only by default. Approval when it matters.

An agent can ask for a capability without gaining the authority to silently grant itself broad access.

Inspect

List available capabilities, token metadata, personal usage, budget status, and safe denial explanations.

Request

Submit purpose, provider, capability, budget, expiration, estimated calls, and task context for a temporary token.

Approve

A human can review, edit, approve, or deny requests that do not match a configured low-risk template.

Collect once

The requesting actor can collect an approved Gate Token once through MCP. Later status checks return metadata only.

Real keys in. Scoped tokens out.

Give each machine identity only what it needs.

Start with one provider credential and one tightly scoped test token. Expand the boundary only when the work requires it.